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 Forests and agroforest systems produce a variety of global environmental services, including 
carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. Without payments for these services, land 
uses that include forests might not be attractive for private owners. This is certainly true in the 
tropics, where crops and pasture have been expanded at the expense of forests (United Nations, 
Food and Agriculture Organization). Such conversion releases stored carbon to the atmosphere 
and reduces biodiversity. International payments for these services may help prevent land 
conversion, thereby diminishing the negative impact on the environment.  
A variety of economic models have been used to evaluate the effect of land-use policies 
that enhance the environmental services from forests. Econometric approaches have provided 
insights into the aggregated impact of carbon uptake and conservation policies (Stavins; 
Deininger and Minten; Plantinga, Alig and Cheng); general equilibrium models have been used 
for predicting the effects of environmental payments (Callaway and McCarl); and optimal 
control models have strengthened knowledge concerning mitigation of climate change through 
forestry (Sohngen and Mendelsohn; van Kooten). But the evaluation of conservation policies 
rarely takes into account risk, a factor that is often decisive in allocating land uses (Collender and 
Zilberman; Just and Pope). In this study, therefore, we focus on farmers’ land allocation 
problems under risk and evaluate how risk-efficient conservation policies might be used to 
maintain existing forest/agroforest areas.  
Mean-variance (MV) analysis is a classical approach to risk management (Markowitz). 
Widely used in the financial world, its application is limited to situations where (1) the decision-
maker’s utility function is quadratic or (2) the location and scale parameter condition is satisfied 
(Meyer). The first condition is theoretically unsatisfactory because it implies that decision-
makers have increasing absolute risk aversion; the second provides a broader application of MV 
  2to situations where return distributions are related to each other by location and scale. Meyer and 
Rasche demonstrated that this is often the case for portfolios comprised of financial data, but 
their results have not been replicated in settings outside financial markets (Robinson and Myers). 
An alternative to MV analysis is the more general choice rule based on stochastic dominance 
(SD). This approach is nonparametric because it does not require explicit specification of an 
investor’s utility function, or restrictions on the functional forms of probability distributions. SD 
criteria account for the entire probability distribution and employ general conditions for an 
investor’s risk preferences. Despite the theoretical appeal of SD criteria, MV has found broader 
applications in empirical portfolio analysis. The main reason is that the traditional SD approach 
is unable to analyze situations in which portfolio diversification is possible, and identify if a 
given portfolio is efficient under SD criteria (Levy 1992, 1998). Recent developments of SD 
theory enable researchers to address problems dealing with portfolio diversification (Shalit and 
Yitzhaki; Kuosmanen; Post). 
As in the case of portfolio diversification, application of SD to farm diversification 
problems has been limited. If land can be freely apportioned into smaller plots and used for 
different crops, this provides opportunity for the farmer to decrease income volatility in the same 
way that an investor diversifies a portfolio by choosing different securities. Traditional SD 
applications in agricultural economics (Cochran, Robinson and Lodwick; Barley and 
Richardson; Klemme) have been criticized for ignoring farm diversification possibilities. McCarl 
et al. demonstrated that SD comparisons of unmixed alternatives might lead to wrong results 
when land uses are not mutually exclusive. In particular, if the return series for different land 
uses have little correlation, farmers could hedge their risks by diversifying, with a portfolio 
consisting of mixed land uses potentially preferred in the SD sense.  
  3So far, there are few (if any) applications of SD theory in situations where farm 
diversification is possible. In this study, we develop a methodological basis for such SD 
applications, based on recent theoretical advances, and determine the conditions under which the 
preservation of forest and agroforest systems would be part of an efficient portfolio.  
We begin our investigation with a brief review of stochastic dominance rules. We then 
provide a theoretical framework for the determination of risk-efficient conservation payments 
under different SD criteria. The theoretical model is applied to a West Ecuador case study. The 
study area is described, relevant data are provided and major findings of the empirical 
application are discussed. Some conclusions follow.  
Stochastic Dominance Rules  
Farms with mutually-exclusive land uses 
Assume that a landowner must decide whether to invest in forestry/agroforestry, f, or some crop, 
g, with cumulative net revenue distribution functions given by F(x) and G(x), respectively. 
Forestry dominates the crop alternative by first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) iff 
(1)   G(x) – F(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R, with at least one strict inequality.   
The FSD criterion has an intuitive interpretation in terms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
expected utility theory: if one investment alternative dominates another, every non-satiated 
investor (with non-decreasing utility function, U′≥0) will prefer the dominant alternative. While 
this criterion seems reasonable, it is not very discerning. In practice, the cumulative distributions 
of net returns of the two investment alternatives often intersect, in which case FSD cannot 
discriminate between the alternatives.  
  4If investors are risk averse in addition to insatiable (i.e., U′≥0 and U′′≤0), second-order 
stochastic dominance (SSD) could be used to choose between investment alternatives. Formally, 
forestry dominates cropping in the SSD sense iff 
(2)   , with at least one strict inequality.  ()R x dz z F z G
x
∈ ∀ ≥ − ∫
∞ −
0 ) ( ) (
In words, SSD requires that the area under the cumulative density function for forestry is always 
smaller than the area under the cumulative density function for the crop. Every risk-averse, non-
satiable investor prefers the investment alternative that dominates by SSD. 
In empirical analysis, the probability distributions G and F are unknown and must be 
estimated from available data. Hence, we consider a finite, discrete sample of observations on 
returns in forestry and a crop alternative over T periods, which we interpret as states of nature. 
We assume the states are drawn randomly with replacement from a common pool of possible 
states. These are assumed to be identically and independently distributed such that each observed 
state is equally likely to occur in any period, and the occurrence of a state in one period does not 
influence the probability distribution in any other period.  
Standard algorithms for identifying stochastic dominance utilize pair-wise comparisons 
of sorted series of net revenue distributions (Levy 1992, 1998). Denote original time series of net 
revenues from forestry and cropping by yf and yg, respectively, and the vectors of the re-arranged 
series sorted in ascending order by xf and xg. From the sorted revenue series, we construct the 
cumulative sum vector xf′ with elements i as  











  5The same procedure is used to obtain xg′. We can now express the empirical SD rules as follows 
(Levy 1992): 
(4)    FSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff xf,i ≥ xg,i ∀i =1,….,T  
(5)     SSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff x´f,i ≥ x´g,i ∀i =1,….,T 
with at least one strict inequality holding in both cases.  
Farms with diversification possibilities 
The pair-wise comparison of empirical revenue distributions applies to situations where land-use 
alternatives are mutually exclusive. If farmers diversify their production, the rules based on pair-
wise comparisons fail to account for the infinite number of different land-use portfolios. Using 
portfolio weights w = (wf, wg) for forestry and cropping, the revenue portfolios are represented 
by the vector  . The key to empirical application of SD rules under portfolio 
diversification is to preserve the cross-sectional structure of revenues, because it is impossible to 
recover portfolio returns from the sorted revenue series; for example, 
pf fg ww =+ yy g y
f fg ww +≠ yy g f fg g ww + xx  (see Kuosmanen). That is, when series are first sorted according to 
each series’ revenues and then portfolio revenues are estimated given w, it is possible to get 
portfolios consisting of crop revenues of different years (say a portfolio consisting of 50% of 
year 1990 coffee with 50% of year 2000 maize), and that is unreasonable. Therefore, an 
alternative criterion is required to sort series.  
Shalit and Yitzhaki, and Post, propose to sort all revenue series according to the portfolio 
returns yp, such that portfolio returns are in ascending order. Denote the resulting sorted portfolio 
revenue series by  , and the revenue series for forestry and cropping, sorted according to the 




w x  and  g
w x , respectively. While elements of   are in ascending order,  p
w x
  6the elements of  f
w x  and  g
w x  are usually not. The rationale for sorting all series according to the 
portfolio returns is to guarantee that  pf fg ww g = + xxx .  
x
,, f i x x ≥
w
, f i x x ′ ≥
w
Following Shalit and Yitzhaki, we apply SD rules (4) and (5) to revenue series sorted 
according to the portfolio revenues rather than separately for each crop, to get the so-called 
marginal conditional stochastic dominance (MCSD) rules. Again, we form the cumulative sum 
vectors  f
′ w x  and  g
′ w , as in (3). The first- and second-order marginal conditional stochastic 
dominance (FMCSD and SMCSD) rules are defined as follows:
1 
(6)   FMCSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff  g  ∀i =1,….,T  i
w
, (7)     SMCSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff  g
′ ∀i =1,….,T   i
w
with at least one strict inequality holding in both cases.  
Shalit and Yitzhaki show that, if an asset (here forestry) dominates another asset (crop) 
by SMCSD, every non-satiated risk-averse landowner (investor) will be better off if the portfolio 
weight of the dominating asset is increased at the expense of the dominated one. One can verify 
that FMCSD implies that every non-satiated landowner (irrespective of risk preferences) will 
benefit from an increase in the portfolio weight of the dominating asset at the expense of the 
dominated one.  
Stochastic Dominance for Determining Conservation Payments 
Suppose the owner of forest/agroforest land considers converting the land to an alternative use. 
Three mutually exclusive situations can be distinguished:  
(A)  Forestry is not a risk-efficient land use: At least one land-use alternative dominates 
forestry, and retaining forests is suboptimal. Complete deforestation is likely to occur.  
  7(B)  Forestry is a risk-efficient land use, but not the only one: Depending on landowner 
preferences, a part of the farm-forest will be converted to alternative uses. Partial 
deforestation is likely to occur. 
(C)  Forestry is the only risk-efficient land use: Forestry dominates all alternative land uses, 
thereby guaranteeing that all existing forests are kept – no deforestation is likely.  
By introducing a conservation payment, s, the authority influences occurrence of A, B or C. The 
minimum payment required to ensure that forestry is not dominated by another land use (i.e., the 
limiting case between A and B) is denoted by smin. It can also be interpreted as the maximum 
payment for which alternative A (total deforestation) remains the optimal strategy. Similarly, the 
minimum payment required to guarantee that forestry dominates all other land uses, with all 
landowners finding forestry the optimal expected utility maximizing land use (i.e., the limiting 
case between B and C) is denoted by smax. The values smin and smax represent the extreme 
boundary points for the range of possible conservation payments: any payment below smin will 
have no effect on conservation, whereas any payment above smax will have no additional 
conservation benefit. In both cases, financial resources would be wasted. Therefore, a rational 
conservation authority should always choose a payment within the range (smin, smax).  
If we knew these bounds at the micro level of individual farms or plots, it would be 
possible to map out the upper and lower boundaries of a supply curve for nature conservation in 
a nonparametric fashion. Specifically, one could arrange the smin and smax values for different 
plots of land in ascending order, accumulate the land areas from the smallest smin (smax) to the 
largest, and plot the cumulative land area on the horizontal axis with the smin and smax values on 
the vertical axis. Given a target level for total land area to be conserved, we could use such 
supply curves to estimate a range for the necessary conservation payment, and identify which 
  8parcels of land would be most likely to fall under conservation.  
Alternatively, we could estimate the smin and smax values at a more aggregated regional 
level, thereby providing a conservation agency with a crude but relatively inexpensive 
preliminary check on the feasibility of conservation in that region. We illustrate this approach in 
more detail below using shaded-coffee in Ecuador.  
The stochastic dominance approach provides a framework for estimating the smin and smax 
values, assuming either mutually exclusive land uses or farm diversification. Given that both 
settings can be observed in practice, we evaluate both before considering our case study.  
Farms with mutually-exclusive land uses 
In order to find smin and smax under FSD, we recognize that a non-stochastic conservation 
payment shifts the cumulative distribution function of forestry returns to the right. Thus, each xf,i 
from forestry is now xf,i + s. Using FSD conditions (4), we get:
2  
(8)   FSD:      smin=mini(xg,i – xf,i) and smax=maxi(xg,i – xf,i).     
Similarly, using (5) we get for SSD:  
(9)   SSD:     
min






















 .     
 
Since we know that negative payments are not possible, all equations for  smin and smax are 
truncated at zero. 
The level of payment for a risk-neutral landowner, for whom smax=smin=E(xg,i–xf,i), lies 
between the FSD limits. The upper and lower bounds in SD analysis emerge due to heterogeneity 
of landowners’ preferences. If all of them had the same utility function, we would have smax=smin 
based on direct expected utility analysis. If we know little about their utility function, as in FSD, 
we expect a broad range between smax and smin. Further knowledge of the utility function (e.g., 
  9U′′≤ 0, making SSD valid) narrows this payment range.  
The conditions for smin and smax could be extended to cases where more than one 
alternative land use exists. By comparing forestry with each of the alternative land uses, we 
obtain a single smax and smin for each comparison. The overall smax is the maximum of all the 
individual smax, and the overall smin is the maximum of all the individual smin. We could also 
interpret these payments as measures of the efficiency of land use f. Large values of (overall) smin 
represent land uses that are least risk efficient, while small values of (overall) smax represent risk-
efficient land uses that nearly dominate all other land uses.
3 
Farms with diversification possibilities 
The minimum and maximum bounds determined so far pertain to the case where all land is 
assigned a single use. Applying the previous insights to the FMCSD criteria, we get the 
following minimum and maximum payments: 
(10)   FMCSD:   smin =  ( ,, min ) g if i i x x −
ww and smax =  ( ) ,, max g if i i x x −
ww . 
Similarly, the minimum and maximum payments under SMCSD are: 




























 .  
Note the similarity of these conditions with the ones for FSD and SSD. The only difference is 
that here the series are sorted according to portfolio revenues. The FMCSD (SMCSD) conditions 
give the minimum and maximum bounds for the conservation payment to guarantee that all non-
satiated (and risk-averse) landowners have no incentive at the margin to increase the weight of 
cropping in the land portfolio. If there is only one alternative crop g, these bounds fully exhaust 
the diversification options. However, if there are multiple alternative crops (say g and h), the 
bounds should be constructed so that there is no portfolio of alternative crops that dominates 
  10forestry in the sense of MCSD.  
Since the current portfolio weights are denoted by w, we use vg and vh as the portfolio 
weights of crops g and h in the sub-portfolio that threatens to replace forestry as the land use. To 
take the diversification options fully into account, we need to solve the following max-min and 
max-max problems: 
(12)   FMCSD:    ( ) min , , , , max min ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x x   =+ −  
ww w  and 
( ) max , , , , max max ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x x   =+ −  
ww w        
   
(13)   SMCSD:    
min , , , ,
1
max min ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x
i
x    ′ ′′ =+  −     
ww w  and 
max , , , ,
1
max max ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x
i
x    ′ ′′ =+  −     
ww w      
  
subject to vg + vh = 1 and vg, vh ≥ 0. In practice, these bounds can be found by solving the linear 
programming (LP) problems in the Appendix.  
Case Study: Shaded-Coffee in West Ecuador 
In this section, we apply our theoretical developments to the conservation of a shaded-coffee, 
agroforest system in a developing country. Compared to a mono-cultural land use, this system is 
richer in biodiversity (Perfecto et al.) albeit economically less attractive. The example provides a 
practical demonstration of our approach, but one that can only be considered a crude guide for 
policymakers because of the poor quality of our data.  
  11The study area is in the province of Manabí, located in the tropical lowlands of West 
Ecuador. The natural vegetation is a continuation of the El Chocó, a bio-geographical region 
known as one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots because of its species richness, high levels of 
endemism, and stress from human activities (Myers et al.). Primary forests remain mostly in 
protected areas such as the Mache Chindul Reserve and the Machalilla National Park. Important 
areas of coffee plantations are found throughout Manabí, which constitutes one of the main 
regions of coffee production under shade. While state and private actions increasingly protect 
primary forests, shaded-coffee systems that provide a buffer zone for biodiversity protection are 
being cleared. Government estimates suggest that coffee plantations have been reduced 
nationally by about 40% during the last decade (SICA).  
We consider four land-use alternatives: shaded-coffee, upland rice, maize, and pasture for 
dairy cows and cattle. Time series for estimating yearly revenues are available for 1967-2002 
from several government offices in charge of agricultural statistics. For coffee, rice and maize 
yield, we have data for 1991-2002 (SICA) and 1967-1990 (MAG), respectively.
4 Since these 
series correspond to country-level yield data, we convert them to provincial yields based on 
factors obtained from the 2000 census (INEC, MAG and SICA). For dairy and cattle, we assume 
constant yields over time. This approximation is valid because farmers are able to mitigate 
weather risks that affect cattle growth. During unexpected dry seasons farmers can move cattle 
temporarily to other parcels, for example, but a farmer growing maize or rice has few 
alternatives during an unanticipated drought. Cattle yield is estimated using a method described 
by Benítez et al. For the stocking density of 1.1 head per ha found in Manabí province, the 
estimated growth in cattle live weight yield is 93 kg per year, while a dairy cow in this region 
yields 2.6 liters of milk per day (INEC, MAG and SICA). Since 41% of the livestock herd 
  12consists of cows and 40% of them produce milk, annual production is calculated to be 172 l/ha.  
 Producer prices for crops are available for the periods 1991-2002 (SICA) and 1978-1990 
(Whitaker, Colyer and Alzamora). For the period 1967-1977, we estimate producer prices as a 
function of retail prices (INEC). In 2000, the local currency (sucre) was officially eliminated and 
replaced by the US dollar, which had a strong effect on inflation. To reduce the impact of 
monetary policies and dollarization on profit distributions, we estimated net revenues in constant 
year 2000 US$ based on Ecuador’s consumer price index (INEC). Prices before 2000 are first 
converted into constant (year 2000) sucre and then transformed into US dollars using the 2000 
exchange rate; dollar prices after 2000 are converted into constant US dollars using the CPI. 
Cost estimates are based on survey data from 2003. For coffee, costs include land 
preparation, planting, cleaning, pruning and shade control. Land preparation and planting costs 
are annualized using a discount rate of 5% and a period of 15 years.
5 For annual crops (maize 
and rice), costs include land preparation, seeds, planting, fertilizer, weeding and pest control. 
These costs are the same (in real terms) for all years except for seed costs, which depend on 
annual crop prices. Variable costs include harvest and transport costs. For cattle, costs include 
brush control, the opportunity costs of cattle stock, cattle losses, vaccines and pest control. The 
opportunity costs of cattle and costs associated with cattle losses also depend on annual (cattle) 
prices. General farm costs such as administration and fence maintenance are not included, since 
they have no influence on land-use choice. Based on this information, we estimate net revenues 
for each year as the product of price and yield minus costs. 
Revenue trends  
SD analysis is based on the assumption that each observed state of nature is equally likely to 
occur and that the probabilities do not change over time. This assumption is not valid if revenue 
  13follows a time trend, as is the case if crop yield (q) is a function of time (t):  
(14)      q t = a + bt + et . 
Then expected returns depend on time in contrast to the assumption that returns are equally likely 
to occur. Returns can be de-trended, however, before determining the SD of a series. A series can 
be de-trended using, among others, first differencing, digital filtering and piece-wise 
polynomials. We employ the most common procedure of curve fitting. We first test for the 
existence of significant trends in the yields and prices of each of the four land uses by testing if 
the coefficient b in (14) is statistically significant.
6 Results indicate that maize yields have an 
increasing trend and rice prices a decreasing trend; both are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
It is reasonable to expect that the increase in land productivity due to technological 
improvements (e.g., development of new seeds) has its limits and that growth in yield should 
decline over time. Nor can prices fall continuously. Therefore, a concave trend function (in our 
case logarithmic) is considered in addition to a linear trend, and both trend functions are tested 
(table 1). Diagnostic tests of the residuals include White’s heteroskedasticity test, Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation Test, and the Jarque Bera test for normality. Based on R
2 and 
diagnostic tests of the residuals, we select a linear model for both rice and maize.
7 We de-trend 
the series by adding the residuals of the linear regression to the expected value of equation (14) 
at time T. In this way, the trends of the series are eliminated and our expectations at time T 
coincide with the expected value of the series. 
Once the price and yield series are corrected for trend, we re-estimate net revenues. The 
descriptive statistics for the net revenue series, including the Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk tests 
for normality, are provided in table 2. Non-normality is particularly evident for coffee and it is 
  14caused by both positive skewness and high kurtosis. This motivates the use of the SD approach, 
which is valid for any type of distribution.  
<Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping has been used to increase the power of empirical applications of stochastic 
dominance tests. One of the advantages is that bootstrapping smoothes the cumulative density 
function (CDF) in a way that mitigates problems associated with obtaining reliable estimates of 
order statistics (Nelson and Pope). For example, sample error might lead to estimating order 
statistics above (or below) the real CDF. By repetitive re-sampling with replacement, 
bootstrapping smoothes such ‘highs’ and ‘lows’ and allows SD tests to be more discerning as it 
avoids inadvertent intersection of cumulative distributions.  
A simple bootstrapping algorithm based on Nelson and Pope is employed. We first re-
sample with replacement from the original empirical distribution function (EDF) and then find 
the average of each order statistic for computing a new EDF. The number of samples needs to be 
sufficiently large (we used 1000 sample), so that the resulting distribution will not be affected by 
additional re-sampling. Irregularities are eliminated and the bootstrapped distribution is assumed 
to be the appropriate one for estimating the risk efficient conservation payments under FSD and 
SSD.  
Results and Discussion 
We now estimate the risk-efficient conservation payments under conditions of mutually 
exclusive land-use alternatives and when full portfolio diversification is allowed.  
  15Farms with mutually exclusive land uses 
The FSD efficient land-use alternatives can be determined by direct observation of the 
intersections of the (bootstrapped) EDFs of the different land uses (figure 1). The EDF for maize 
is always to the right of that of rice, indicating that maize dominates rice by FSD. Since the 
EDFs for coffee, pasture and maize all intersect, the FSD efficient set contains these three land 
uses. To rank the other land uses requires further differentiation, which we do using SSD. 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Since maize dominates rice by FSD, it also dominates rice by SSD. Maize dominates 
coffee and coffee dominates rice by SSD, but there is no dominance relation between maize and 
pasture. Thus, the SSD efficient set consists of maize and pasture. These results explain some of 
the land-use choices in the study region, particularly the conversion of existing shaded-coffee 
areas.  
Finding the risk-efficient payment for conservation requires estimates of smin and smax 
that, in turn, depend on the alternative land-use opportunities. We calculate the minimum and 
maximum bounds required for making coffee a risk-efficient land-use alternative, comparing 
coffee returns separately with each alternative land use. The results are reported in table 3. Since 
coffee is FSD efficient, the lower bound smin is equal to zero in the FSD case. The upper bound 
smax varies between $2/ha and $55/ha per annum. In the SSD case, the minimum conservation 
payment required is $30/ha (to break SSD dominance by maize). The maximum payment is 
$55/ha, which would suffice to guarantee that coffee dominates all other alternatives.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
These payments can be compared with those required under risk-neutrality, where only 
expected values matter. Interestingly, a risk neutral landowner would be indifferent between 
  16coffee and maize if paid a conservation payment of $30/ha, which turns out to be equal to the 
corresponding smin value. When we compare coffee with pasture or rice, there is no need for a 
payment under risk-neutral conditions as the mean net return to coffee is higher. However, to 
ensure all risk-averse landowners prefer coffee over pasture may require a payment as great as 
$55/ha (based on SSD). Such a risk premium represents 70% of the average net revenues for 
coffee. This suggests it is the high variability of coffee revenues that discourages risk-averse 
landowners from growing shaded-coffee, even though expected coffee revenues are competitive 
with returns to other land uses. 
These results stress the need for considering risk when implementing conservation policy 
instruments. In the present case, offering a conservation payment of $30/ha to cover the 
difference in expected revenues between maize and coffee would likely prove ineffective as a 
conservation policy, because farmers would still have to bear the greater risk associated with 
coffee returns.  
Farms with diversification possibilities 
In this section we first illustrate the MCSD concept using an arbitrary equally-weighted (50-50) 
portfolio of coffee and maize and then determine risk-efficient payments under MCSD based on 
existing land-use shares in West Ecuador. To illustrate the concept of FMCSD, cumulative 
probabilities of net revenues with a portfolio consisting of coffee 
w
f x  and maize  g
w x , as well as 
their respective components, are provided in figure 2 (panel A). (The axes in the figure have 
been reversed for better presentation.) One land use dominates another under FMCSD if there is 
no intersection of the individual land-use curves. As shown in the figure, both curves intersect, 
so we conclude that there is no FMCSD between coffee and maize for such a portfolio. The 
cumulative series for determining SMCSD are indicated in panel B, figure 2. Since the series for 
  17maize are always above the ones of coffee, maize dominates coffee by SMCSD. We conclude 
that second-order dominance does exist. 
To estimate the efficient conservation payments under the MCSD criteria, we interviewed 
92 coffee producers, finding that 35% of them do not diversify their land use. The remainder 
employs different combinations of land uses that, on average, have the portfolio shares shown in 
table 4. As in the case of no diversification, we estimate risk-efficient conservation payments that 
prevent conversions of shaded-coffee to other uses at the margin. These results are also 
summarized in table 4, where smin and smax payments under FMCSD and SMCSD are provided.  
<Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 about here> 
The results confirm the theoretical expectation that the level of a risk-efficient payment 
depends on the given portfolio shares. In most of the portfolios analyzed, the payment smax under 
MCSD is higher than under SSD. Importantly, under SSD and SMCSD, the minimum payment 
smin is often the difference in expected net returns between coffee and maize. To understand this 
peculiarity, note that a payment smin requires breaking the dominance of maize over coffee. Since 
the distribution of coffee has a greater spread than that of maize, this dominance can only be 
broken by adding a payment that results in both land uses having the same mean. Then maize can 
never dominate coffee by SSD.  
Discussion 
Conservation agencies aim to engage farmers whose land uses provide the highest biodiversity, 
carbon sequestration and watershed benefits. In West Ecuador, such land use is shaded-coffee, 
which is also the most risky alternative. As a result, conservation payments need to be higher 
than would be the case if farmers were risk neutral.
8 Determining the smin and smax bounds can 
prove an inexpensive preliminary check for the conservation agency. One has to pay at least smin 
  18to get any results. If smin is already considered too high, conservation efforts should concentrate 
on areas with lower opportunity costs. Further, the conservation agency should never end up 
paying more than smax. If this is less than what coffee consumers might be willing to pay for 
coffee produced in a biodiversity-rich fashion, then the project should go ahead.  
When the interval  smin–smax is large, a more thorough investigation of farmers’ risk 
preferences is needed. As an illustration, consider the impact of the degree of risk aversion in a 
hypothetical situation where farmers’ preferences are represented by an exponential utility 
function  ( () e x p ux x ) ρ =− − ; coefficient ρ can be interpreted as the Arrow-Pratt measure of 
absolute risk aversion. When land uses are mutually exclusive, the optimal payment for 
conservation is the minimum payment that allows agroforest to have at least the same expected 
utility as the second-best alternative land use. Figure 3 shows the required payment for 
preserving shaded-coffee in West Ecuador under different degrees of risk aversion, ranging from 
risk neutral (ρ close to 0) to highly risk-averse (ρ =0.015) landowners.
9  
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
The required payments are always located between the smin and smax bounds. For this 
utility function, the optimal payment comes close to the smin value at low levels of absolute risk 
aversion. However, the optimal payment remains well below smax even for the highest levels of 
absolute risk aversion; in order to attain smax, some other type of utility function is required. 
Interestingly, even if we made a fairly strong assumption about the exponential utility function, 
this would not suffice to close the gap between the smin and smax values. In this example, more 
than half of the [smin, smax] interval is attributable to uncertainty about landowners’ degree of risk 
aversion. The key strength of the SD approach is its minimal assumptions: the SD based smin and 
  19smax values bound the optimal payment for all well-behaved utility functions and all levels of risk 
aversion.  
If data are not of sufficiently high quality, however, the minimal assumptions of SD 
could constitute a weakness of the method. In our empirical example, three issues arise that 
might trigger discrepancies: (1) the use of aggregated time series (ATS), (2) the endogeneity of 
observed land uses, and (3) the irreversibility and switching costs associated with land 
conversion. These deserve further discussion. 
In many empirical applications ATS are used because farm-level data are not available, 
or data that are available cover too short a period or are considered of too poor quality. ATS 
usually consist of hectare-weighted averages over a sample of farms. This averaging over farms 
tends to eliminate farm-specific information. Therefore, using ATS emphasizes inter-temporal 
randomness common to all producers and de-emphasizes farm-specific randomness (Just and 
Weninger). In our study, the impact of using ATS on net revenue distributions is expected to be 
small because the risk that coffee growers face is mainly associated with price volatility. Also, 
inter-temporal yield variability is expected to be larger than farm-specific variability. In 
particular, yield risk associated with crops growing in Manabi is associated with the length of the 
rainy season, droughts and El Niño, which affect all farmers. In a general setting, however, farm-
level variability might turn out to be more relevant and ATS should be corrected using 
appropriate methods (see Goodwin and Ker).  
Endogeneity of observed land use is another problem in empirical studies. Specifically, 
the estimated revenue distributions are solely based on lands currently in production; for 
example, the revenue distribution for maize is estimated for the land currently growing maize. 
Maize yields are likely to be lower on lands less suitable for maize, such as pasture. However, 
  20the suitability of land for a particular type of production is not taken into account in revenue 
distribution estimates. In practice, such quality differences are difficult to deal with because we 
do not observe the same land in all of the different uses; this would require an experimental 
setting. If we could somehow adjust the revenue distributions to reflect appropriate differences in 
land quality, we would expect the farmers to favor current land uses. Presumably, the land 
currently growing shaded-coffee is relatively more productive in that activity than in any 
alternative use. Thus, if endogeneity of land-use choices was taken into account, the estimated 
smin and smax payments would be smaller. 
Finally, irreversibility of land-use decisions creates an option value when future returns are 
uncertain (Clarke and Reed), and this needs to be taken into account. Real-option models were 
developed to quantify such a premium on land value, providing more realistic information on 
conservation policy performance (Schatzki). However, Bulte et al. showed that the option value 
associated with irreversible destruction of primary forests is likely very small. Furthermore, as 
our example does not refer to the conservation of primary forest but of shaded-coffee production 
as a biodiversity-rich agroforest system, irreversibility in the strict sense is unlikely to be a 
problem. Yet, irreversible (sunk) investment expenditures occur because coffee yields and 
revenues are only expected to begin three years after planting. In addition, after abandoning 
coffee temporarily or switching to another crop, further sunk costs have to be taken into account 
when trying to restart coffee production (Pindyck). This situation can lead to ‘land-use 
hysteresis’, where coffee, although an economically less attractive land use, is not converted to 
cropland due to sunk costs and uncertainty about future returns (Schatzki). Higher uncertainty 
increases the value of the option to convert and, thus, decreases the likelihood of conversion. 
Schatzki notes that changes in net returns might depend on permanent or non-permanent shocks 
  21to yields, prices and costs, and that the resulting net effect on returns might not follow a pure 
random walk. Lower correlation between shocks to alternative land-use returns would increase 
the option value. This issue seems of particular importance to farms with diversification 
possibilities, where the flexibility in choosing land use is valued. In our case study, some land-
use returns are not correlated, which might result in a higher option value. Consequently, the 
estimated smin and smax payments would be smaller if irreversibility was taken into account.  
In conclusion, by ignoring the effects of endogeneity and irreversibility, our estimates of 
the required conservation payments constitute an overestimate, which needs to be considered 
when interpreting smin values in particular. If the effects of endogeneity and irreversibility are 
strong, payments below smin
 might be effective for many risk-averse landowners. The original 
interpretation of the smax values as conservative upper bounds still applies, but lower (and hence 
more efficient) smax estimates could be obtained if the effects of endogeneity and irreversibility 
are taken into account.   
Summary and Conclusions 
We extended the use of stochastic dominance rules in agricultural economics by analyzing 
situations with full farm diversification, and applied this theory to the identification of the 
conservation payments needed to prevent land-use change that reduces biodiversity in 
developing countries. In particular, we introduced two efficiency measures for evaluating forest/ 
agroforest land use: (1) the minimum risk-free payment (smin) required to ensure that forestry is 
not dominated by any other land use; and (2) the minimum risk-free payment (smax) guaranteeing 
that forestry dominates all other land uses. Large values of smin represent land uses that are least 
risk-efficient, while small values of smax represent risk-efficient land uses that nearly dominate all 
  22other land uses. Knowledge of smin and smax helps to identify intervention strategies – payments 
for conservation – that can be implemented efficiently.  
The methodology was applied to a West Ecuador case study, where shaded-coffee is 
compared with the most important alternative land uses in the region. Results indicate that (1) 
shaded-coffee is not a risk-efficient land use, no matter whether diversification is possible or not. 
This goes a long way towards explaining current land uses. (2) The extant distribution of land 
uses has a strong impact on the required conservation payment. (3) Land-use policy interventions 
need to incorporate risk-hedging strategies and insurance possibilities for small farmers, 
instruments that are slowly developing in Ecuador’s financial markets. Diversification can be 
used to hedge risks in shaded-coffee areas. For example, it is possible to incorporate fruit trees 
among shaded-coffee plants. The optimum crop-mix for a shaded-coffee parcel could be 
estimated with a similar approach as that used in this article, namely, using an LP program to 
find the optimal crop-mix that minimizes smin (or smax) payments given the distributions of net 
returns to coffee, fruit trees, maize and so on. 
While provision of risk-free payments for protecting coffee areas is one strategy, a better 
alternative might be to make conservation payments dependent on the coffee revenue of the 
farm. In such an arrangement, the conservation agent would bear part of the coffee farmers’ 
income risk, and would benefit in the form of lower total costs for conservation as the risks 
cancel out when spread across many farmers and over time. Clearly, a large international 
conservation agency is more capable of bearing risks than a small farmer operating in a 
developing country. Taking the risk preferences of both landowners and the conservation agency 
explicitly into account would require a game theoretic analysis, where the analytical smin and smax 
  23bounds characterized above would represent individual rationality conditions for the landowners. 
Such a game theoretic analysis is left as a topic for future research. 
Finally, our method for estimating risk-efficient conservation payments could be used to 
derive cost curves for a variety of environmental services and for diverse climate change 
applications. This may be particularly apt in the case of carbon sequestration as the Kyoto 
Protocol allows trading carbon offsets from forestry and agricultural activities. To derive a 
carbon uptake cost curve, it is necessary to first define a wide range of possible portfolios and 
then estimate the carbon level for each. For each portfolio, there is a corresponding level of 
compensation (or carbon uptake costs), and that information can be used to estimate a supply 
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Since σ  is constrained to be less than or equal to the objective of the original max-min problem 
∀ i = 1,…,T, and since at least one of the inequalities must be binding in the optimal solution, σ  
represents the minimum bound. Thus, setting portfolio weights vg and vh to maximize σ  will 
give the solution to the max-min problem. 
The objective function for the max-max problem is linear, so the LP solution gives the 
extreme values vg =1 and vh =0, or vice versa. Thus, the maximum bound (smax) is calculated in 
two steps. First, make a pair-wise comparison between forest and all other crops and find smax for 
each comparison, following equations (10) and (11). Then, choose the larger smax. 








Test, 2 lags. 
p-value, 
J. Bera test, 
p-value 
Rice_price        
 Linear trend  0.407  0.376  0.08  0.069 
 Logarithm trend  0.278  0.611  0.01*  0.173 
Maize yield        
 Linear trend  0.658  0.00004*  0.2  0.394 
 Logarithm trend  0.492  0.034*  0.0048*  0.01* 
* Significant at the 5% confidence level or better 
  31Table 2. Summary Statistics for Net Revenues Series of Land-use Systems in Manabí, 1967-
2002  
 Coffee  Maize*  Rice*  Pasture 
Mean ( 2000 US$/ha)  78  108  57  53 
Standard Deviation (2000 US$/ha)  86  56  61  18 
Skewness 1.6  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Kurtosis 6.5  3.5  2.8  2.3 
Jarque-Bera p-value  0.000  0.4  0.2  0.2 
Shapiro-Wilk. p-value  0.01  0.5  .07  0.01 
* De-trended series 
  32Table 3. Minimum and Maximum Conservation Payments Required to make Coffee a 
Risk-efficient Land Use (Year 2000 US$ per ha) 
Land use alternative to coffee 
Maize Rice  Pasture 
Decision criteria 
smin s max s min s max s min s max 
FSD 0  53  0  2  0  55 
SSD 30  48  0  0  0  55 
Difference in means 
(Risk neutrality assumption) 
30 30  0  0  0  0 
Note: A value of zero is assigned when the estimated payment is negative.  
  33Table 4. Required Payments for Shaded-Coffee Conservation based on Responses from 60 




Land-use shares of representative farms 
smin s max s min s max 
Farms with two land uses        
Coffee: 56%; Pasture: 44%  0  77  0  73 
Coffee:55%; Rice:45%  0  107  0  46 
Coffee: 79%; Maize: 21%  0  204  30  104 
Farms with three land uses        
Coffee: 36%; Rice: 11%; Pasture: 53%  0  107  0  74 
Coffee: 47%; Maize: 15%; Pasture: 38%   0  204  30  104 
Coffee: 68%; Maize: 20%; Rice: 12%  0  204  30  104 
Farms with four land uses        
Coffee: 34%; Maize: 6%; Rice:9%; Pasture: 51%  0  204  30  111 
Note: A value of zero is assigned when the estimated payment is negative.  
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Figure 1. Bootstrapped EDFs for major land uses in West Ecuador 
 
 



































































































Figure 2. Graphical illustration of FMCSD (panel A) and SMCSD (panel B) 







0 0.005 0.01 0.015




































Figure 3. Impact of risk aversion on the required payment for conservation 
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Notes 
1 Shalit and Yitzhaki only consider the second-order MCSD rule. The first-order MCSD rule is 
an innovation made here. 
2 A formal proof is available from the authors upon request. 
3 Here we find an advantage of using SD instead of the traditional MV approach. Under SD, we 
always have a clear answer of how much the smin and smax bounds should be, but under MV there 
are situations where the smax bound cannot be estimated. Suppose forestry has a higher variance 
than cropping. No matter how large the conservation payment for forestry, the MV approach is 
unable to tell us that forestry is unambiguously better than cropping, so smax remains uncertain.   
4 Data sources are from different publications, but most of the primary data on crop yield and 
prices were collected by the Dirección de Información Agropecuaria of the Agricultural 
Ministry. This work has been complemented in the last few years by the World Bank’s SICA 
project, which attempts to improve information management and dissemination. 
5 Coffee has been grown on some parcels for upwards of 80 years, although plants have been 
renewed periodically.  
6 Testing yield and price separately is adequate given the small correlation between the two 
series in the case of rice, maize and pasture. For coffee, there is some correlation between price 
and yield (correlation coefficient is 0.16), so we also tested trends in net revenue. 
7 For maize, yield heteroskedasticity is ignored, which suggests that a more complex trend model 
might be more appropriate. We retain the linear model, however, because of its simplicity and 
relatively high R
2, and to be consistent with the other series.  
8 There are cases when the conservation agency wants to engage farmers on the less-risky 
alternative and this could result on smaller payments than those under risk neutrality. For   39
 
instance, in the Ecuadorian highlands, small risk-free payments for preserving the evergreen 
montane forest and the páramo are sufficient to encourage farmers to stop more risky cropping 
alternatives like potato growing (Echavarria et al.).    
9 Holt and Laury suggest a coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ) of 1.2 for representing highly 
risk-averse decision makers. This corresponds to an absolute risk aversion of 0.016, given that 
ρ= γ /x, and using x=75 as average net revenues for all land uses. 